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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2003, the largest demonstrations since Hong Kong came under
Chinese rule eight years prior took place in Hong Kong.' Nearly half a million
people took to the streets to protest the government's proposal to implement
Article 23 of the Basic Law.2 The proposed law, which the Hong Kong
government is required to implement under the terms of the handover
agreement between Great Britain and the People's Republic of China,3 would
have created offenses for treason, sedition, theft of state secrets, and other
national security crimes.4 While similar laws were on the books during
colonial days, they had not been strictly enforced since the end of World War
I.5 However, many civil liberties groups were fearful that the proposed laws
would be strictly enforced in Hong Kong and used to stifle criticism of the
government.6 Because of the massive demonstrations and protests, the Hong
Kong government withdrew the proposal on September 5, 2003. Initially,
many people anticipated the government would reintroduce the bill before the
2004 elections.8 Instead, because of the outcry over the bill, the Hong Kong
government eventually chose to postpone a vote on the bill. 9 This situation
presented a unique opportunity for an improvement in relations among the
' For Freedom: Halfa Million People Show How Unpopular China's Man in Hong Kong
Has Become, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003, at 35 (noting that the July 1 demonstration was the
second largest in Hong Kong's history, exceeded only by demonstrations set off by the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests; and those were not directed at local authorities).
2 Id.
' Benny Y.T. Tai, The Principle ofMinimum LegislationforImplementing Article 23 ofthe
Basic Law, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 579, 579-80 (2002).
4 See SECURITY BUREAU, PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW,
SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, at 4 (2002), available at http:/ibasiclaw23.gov.hk/
english/download/summarye.pdf.
5 E.g., Albert H.Y. Chen, Comment, How Hong Kong Law Will Change when Article 23
of the Basic Law Is Implemented, 33 HONG KONG L.J. 1, 3 (2003) (describing sedition).
6 See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Hong Kong: Article 23 Legislation-The
Potential for Abuse (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAS
A190042002?.
' See Alexandra Harney & Angela Mackay, Hong Kong Scraps Subversion Bill That
Sparked Massive Demonstration, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at 8, 2003 WL 8230412.
8 See Matt Pottinger & Charles Hutzler, Chinese Reversal in Hong KongReveals Dilemma,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2003, at Al (mentioning that many in Hong Kong expected the proposal
to be reintroduced before summer elections in 2004 so that anti-Article 23 candidates would not
be able to block the legislation if they were subsequently elected).
9 See Harney & Mackay, supra note 7.
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People's Republic of China (China), the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (Hong Kong), and Taiwan.
Among the most vocal foreign critics of the proposal, besides international
human rights groups,l were the people, media, and government of Taiwan."
While the proposal first appeared to be pushing China and Taiwan farther
apart, the Hong Kong government's decision to withdraw the proposal
presented an opportunity for the two nations to move closer together and
towards reconciliation and reunification. China's decisions to be more
responsive to the wishes of its citizens and to be more responsible in
lawmaking and law enforcement, at least in Hong Kong, could have made
reunification with Taiwan a reality. Hopefully, the decision to withdraw the
Article 23 proposal indicates a shift in Chinese policy from one of oppression
and denial of rights to a policy that respects individual rights and due process
of law. Taiwan has indicated that a prerequisite to opening reunification talks
with China is that China must allow the free expression of public opinion and
democracy. 12 If China were to allow these same freedoms in Hong Kong,
Taiwan may be willing to accept those actions as a sign of good faith and may
be receptive to opening reunification talks with the mainland. Thus, the
Chinese government could have laid the foundation for reunification through
a demonstrated commitment to freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The
successful integration of Hong Kong and China could thus serve as a gateway
and model for the reunification of the "two Chinas" that mainland Chinese
have hoped for. 3
Part 1I of this Note will analyze the legal and political relationship between
China and Hong Kong over the past twenty years, from the initial discussions
between Great Britain and China over the return of Hong Kong, through the
introduction of the proposal to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law, up to
the present. Part EI will examine the relationship between China and Taiwan,
specifically regarding the Guidelines for National Unification promulgated by
Taiwan, detailing the requirements that must be fulfilled before Taiwan will
open negotiations with China over a possible reunification. Part IV will
1o See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, supra note 6.
" See, e.g., Taiwan Urges China to Embrace Democracy, Grant Hong Kong More Freedom,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 16,2003 (citing comments by Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian
criticizing the proposal).
12 Guidelines for National Unification, § 1(3) (1991) (Taiwan), http://www.wulaw.wustl.
edu/Chinalaw/twguide.html (last visited June 22, 2005).
1 Colleen M. Granahan, Note, The Prospects of a Successful Reunification of Hong Kong
and China in Light of the Events at Tiananmen Square, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 83, 97-98 (1992).
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analyze what effect the proposal, as well as the politics surrounding it, may
have on the relationship between China and Taiwan, and why this process may
have led to a peaceful reunification of the two countries. Part V will conclude
by discussing why the opportunity for bringing China and Taiwan closer
together was not taken advantage of, but was instead squandered by bickering
and political posturing by the two nations.
H1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND HONG KONG
BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER REUNIFICATION
The relationship between China and Hong Kong began to change
significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the ominous date of July 1,
1997, drew near. 4 On that day, Great Britain's ninety-nine-year lease on the
New Territories of Hong Kong was due to expire, and the Beij ing government
had indicated for some time that it would not renew the lease. 5 The concern
over the expiration of the lease began to have an impact on Hong Kong, as the
economy began to slow down and residents of Hong Kong began to emigrate.16
This occurred largely because people were reluctant to invest and live in such
an uncertain area that was preparing for a possible seismic shift in its
economic, social, and political ways of life. 7 Because of this increasing
uncertainty, the British and Chinese governments began negotiations to discuss
the future of Hong Kong in 1982.18 The negotiations lasted two years and
resulted in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong.' 9 The Joint
Declaration required the Chinese government to create the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, to be "vested with executive, legislative and independ-
ent judicial power."2 Additionally, the Joint Declaration required that the
" See Christopher K. Costa, Comment, One Country--Two Foreign Policies: United States
Relations with Hong Kong After July 1, 1997, 38 ViLL. L. REv. 825, 838-39 (1993).
"5 Id. at 837-38. Not all of the Hong Kong territory was to be returned to China, but the
British government believed the island of Hong Kong would be useless without the New
Territories, which are on the mainland and were due to revert to Chinese control. Id. at 838.
16 Id. at 838-39.
1 See id. at 838.
18 Id. at 839-40.
' Joint Declaration ofthe Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China of the Question of Hong Kong,
Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 1399 U.N.T.S. 33,23 I.L.M. 1366.
20 Id. para. 3(3), 1399 U.N.T.S. at 61.
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laws then "in force in Hong Kong [would] remain basically unchanged."21
Most importantly, the Joint Declaration required that
[T]he current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will
remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and free-
doms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspon-
dence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research
and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.22
To ensure that these policies would be maintained, the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Basic Law) was promulgated by the
Chinese government to serve as the "mini-constitution" and supreme law of
Hong Kong. 23 The original 1988 draft of the Basic Law only requested that
government of Hong Kong to enact legislation "against 'any act designed to
undermine national unity or subvert the Central People's Government.' ,24
This initial draft appeared ominous and threatening to some, but was not of
great concern to most when it was first promulgated.
In the summer of 1989, Chinese troops clashed with student demonstrators
in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, setting off massive demonstrations in Hong
Kong and around the world.25 As a result of both the Tiananmen Square and
Hong Kong protests, the Chinese government amended the Basic Law and
wrote a new article, Article 23.26 The new Article 23 requires the Hong Kong
government to
enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or
21 Id.
22 Id. para. 3(5), 1399 U.N.T.S. at 62.
23 Inbal Sansani, The Threat of Article 23 to Civil Liberties in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, HuM. RTs. BRIEF, Spring 2003, at 28,28, http://www.wcl.american.edu/
hrbrief/hrbriefl 03.pdf.
24 Id.
25 See Costa, supra note 14, at 843 (citing Wendy Dulle Bowie, The Effect of the Tiananmen
Square Massacre upon Negotiations for the Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 8 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 245 (1990), and Christopher D. Chan, International
Section: Hong Kong: China's June 4 Massacre, Emigration and Capital Flight, 3 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 293 (1989)).
26 Sansani, supra note 23, at 28.
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theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or
bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.1
7
This highly detailed and much more restrictive formulation of Article 23 was
not immediately acted upon by the Hong Kong government, but was instead
pushed to the back burner shortly after the 1997 handover.
Five years after the handover from British to Chinese rule, the Hong Kong
government finally introduced a proposal to implement Article 23.28 After
several months of consultations with local non-governmental organizations and
the public, 29 the bill seemed poised for passage until the protests in the summer
of 2003. The massive public outrcy forced Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa to withdraw the bill, as the popular unrest led to legislative unrest.3"
Despite the fears of many pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong, the
government did not reintroduce the Article 23 legislation prior to the
September 2004 elections. In those elections, the pro-democracy groups did
not win as many seats as expected,31 perhaps because the government withdrew
the proposal to take the issue away from the pro-democracy parties. China's
decision to respect democracy and free speech in Hong Kong, as well as to
postpone implementing Article 23, could communicate to Taiwan that China
would be willing to treat Taiwan in a similar fashion. The burden would then
shift to Taiwan to respond to this new opportunity.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN
Ever since the Chinese Nationalists left the mainland for Taiwan in 1949,
relations between the two countries have gone through cycles of calm and
great tension across the Strait of Taiwan. Initially, both the Communist
27 The Basic Law ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ofthe People's Republic
of China, art. 23 (1990) (P.R.C.), 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1524, available at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/
-pchksar/BasicLaw/bas-lawO.htm.
2 Chris Yeung, Urgency Appears to Be the Watchword; Where Once There Seemed No
Rush, Leaders Now Talk of 'Top Priority, 'S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at 2, 2002
WLNR 4480385.
29 Sansani, supra note 23, at 29.
30 See Hamey & Mackay, supra note 7 (describing how opposition to Article 23 led to "a
challenge to the Tung government's authority").
31 Suffrage on Sufferance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004, at 6, 2004 WLNR 10898426.
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government of the mainland and the Nationalist government of Taiwan
claimed that they were the legitimate government of all China, including
Taiwan.32 Since the 1960s, however, the Chinese government has generally
left Taiwan alone, as long as the leaders of Taiwan did not advocate independ-
ence for the island.33 Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the Beijing
government took a softer tone and encouraged economic links between the two
nations as a precursor to reunification. This culminated in the famous "one
country, two systems" proposal by Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping in 198 L"
As Deng originally envisioned it, the "one country, two systems" model
was intended to pave the way for the reunification of Taiwan and China.35 The
key to the proposal was China's willingness to allow Taiwan to retain its
social, economic, and political systems, as well as its armed forces, while
China would be responsible for foreign affairs.36 The two nations began
informal meetings but failed to come any closer to the reunification envisioned
by Deng.37 In the early 1980s, China temporarily abandoned these discussions
and instead began focusing on the question of Hong Kong. 8 Thus Hong Kong,
and not Taiwan, became the beneficiary of and participant in Deng's "one
country, two systems" model.
While China negotiated with Great Britain and prepared for the return of
Hong Kong, Taiwan took the initiative in trying to bring the "two Chinas"
closer together. In 1991, Taiwan issued its own proposal for reunification with
China, known as the Guidelines for National Unification.39 The Guidelines
consist of a three-stage plan that would gradually lead to closer ties between
Taiwan and China ultimately resulting in the establishment of a "democratic,
free and equitably prosperous China." '4 The first stage of the plan consists of
exchanges between the two countries and economic and political reforms by
China.4" The second phase calls for direct commercial links between the two
32 See Y. Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959, 975
(2000).
" See Zhengyuan Fu, China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN Arr. 321, 325-26 (1996-97).
14 Id. at 327.
" See BENJAMIN YANG, DENG: A PoLITicAL BiOGRAPHY 224 (1998).
36 See id.
3 See id.
3 See id. at 224-25.
'9 Guidelines for National Unification (1991) (Taiwan), http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/China
law/twguide.html (last visit June 22, 2005).
40 Id. pmbl.
41 id. § 1.
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countries and mutual visits by government officials.42 The final stage consists
of a long consultation period leading to the reunification of the two Chinas.43
The Guidelines further reaffirmed Taiwan's pledge that it would "not ...
declare formal independence, change [its formal] name to Republic of Taiwan,
insert into the constitution the formula of a 'special state-to-state relationship,'
or promote a referendum with respect to the questions of independence or
unification."
Over the past several decades, mainland China has moved towards more
economic liberalization,4 5 and exchanges in business, sports, and culture
between China and Taiwan have increased greatly since 1987.46 Additionally,
there are now direct commercial and transport links between China and
Taiwan.47 The other conditions set forth by the guidelines, namely that China
allow free expression, implement democracy, and respect the rule of law, have
yet to be satisfied by mainland China.
Through its handling of the Article 23 situation, however, the government
of Hong Kong has continued to allow freedom of expression, has shown
respect for the rule of law, and has moved towards allowing democracy in
Hong Kong.4" This may signify a shift in the thoughts of China's leaders given
the high degree of control China exercises over the Hong Kong government.
Thus, Chinese leadership may have a newfound concern for the freedoms of
speech and expression, as well as democracy and the rule of law. If China
continues to show concern and respect for these values and moves towards
allowing them on the mainland, Taiwan's Guidelines for National Unification
would largely be met, therefore paving the way for the reunification of the two
nations.
42 Id. § 2.
43 Id. § 3.
4' Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not be Trampled Because the Tigers Need Not
Fight-New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Ddtente Across the Taiwan Strait, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 512-13 (2001).
41 See Mure Dickie, Property Rights Take Root: New Investor Protection Laws Appeal to
Both Locals and Foreigners, FIN. TIMES UK, Dec. 31, 2003, at 8, 2003 WLNR 8153647
(discussing proposed revisions to China's constitution to declare private property "inviolable").
' Sylvia A. Chen, The Emerging New International Legal Order in the Western Pacific, 87
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 61, 65 (1993).
4 Officials to SeekRe-Evaluation of 'Mini-three-links, 'TAIwANNEWS, Aug. 30, 2004,2004
WLNR 7420502.
4' For example, half of the sixty seats in Hong Kong's legislature are now elected by popular
vote in geographically-based districts. Suffrage on Sufferance, supra note 3 1.
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IV. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CHINA AND TAIWAN TO
MOVE TOWARDS RECONCILIATION
China and Hong Kong's response to the outcry over the proposal to
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law presented a unique opportunity for
China and Taiwan to move towards a closer relationship. The proposal posed
a significant threat to freedom of speech and freedom of expression in Hong
Kong. The threat to their freedoms encouraged the residents of Hong Kong to
demand more democracy and more accountability from their government. By
choosing not to enact Article 23 in Hong Kong, China showed that it can be
responsive to its citizens and their needs and desires, just as Taiwan is.
Additionally, the potential for further democratic reforms in Hong Kong shows
that China is committed to political reforms. If China were to allow freedom
and democracy to flourish in Hong Kong, Taiwan might be persuaded that
China is willing to comply with the requirements of Taiwan's Guidelines for
National Unification and all of China may be one again.
A. Respecting Freedom of Speech and Expression
The proposal to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law in Hong Kong was
withdrawn primarily because of the massive protests by Hong Kong's
citizens.49 These protests were unlike demonstrations previously held in China
because the government allowed the people to assemble freely to demonstrate
and did not seek retribution, either criminally or civilly, against the protests'
leaders or participants.
The results of the Hong Kong protests and the government's reaction to
them stand in stark contrast to the Tiananmen Square protests over a decade
ago. While the Tiananmen Square protests resulted in the massacre of
unarmed student demonstrators,"0 the Hong Kong protests ended peacefully.
Moreover, the protesters ultimately got what they wanted, as the Hong Kong
government withdrew the proposal.5 2  Additionally, while the Chinese
government retaliated against the Tiananmen Square protesters," no further
" See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
50 Alvin H. Chu, Note, Vindicating the Tiananmen Square Massacre "The Case Against Li
Peng, " 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 199, 200 (2001).
S Michael A. Lev, Hong Kong Marchers Condemn Bill; Many Fear Law Would Subvert
Their Freedom, Ci. TRiB., July 2, 2003, 2003 WLNR 13862360.
52 Pottinger & Hutzler, supra note 8.
13 See Chu, supra note 50, at 200 (noting that "[t]he Chinese authorities later executed some
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action has been taken by the governments of either China or Hong Kong
against the protesters. The peaceful resolution to the Hong Kong protests
could indicate a shift in the thinking of the Chinese government that could in
turn open the door for the extension of free expression into mainland China.
This could placate the Taiwanese, who require China to respect freedom of
expression before they will discuss reunification with the mainland. 4
Just as important as the Hong Kong government's recognition that the July
2003 demonstrators could protest freely and without interference was the
decision to give in to their demands and withdraw the proposal. This also
strikes quite a contrast with China's reaction to the Tiananmen Square protests,
in which the student protesters were violently crushed, leaving their demands
for socioeconomic and democratic reforms unfulfilled." While the Beijing
government still seems reluctant to respond to the demands of its citizens,56 if
it were to begin to respect the requests of the public in mainland China, as it
respected and responded to the demands of the protesters in Hong Kong, it
would assuage the fears of many Taiwanese that a reunited China would not
respect the wishes of Taiwan's citizens.
B. The Implementation of Democracy and the Rule of Law
In addition to protesters' demand for the tabling of the proposal to
implement Article 23, they also demanded more democracy and political
accountability from their government." While Hong Kong residents currently
have some influence in electing the officials who govern them, they are only
allowed to elect half of the legislative branch officials and do not have the
right to vote for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.58 As discussed previously,
the government responded favorably to the protesters' demands that the Article
23 proposal be scrapped. 9 Similarly, the time may also be ripe for the
of the student protestors in public to demonstrate the serious nature of their warnings" that the
protestors" 'would face severe punishment if they did not turn themselves in to authorities' ").
4 See Guidelines for National Unification, supra note 12, § 1(3).
5 See Chu, supra note 50, at 200.
56 See, e.g., Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Learn True Scope of SARS from the Internet, USC
ANNENBERG ONLINE JOURNALISM R., May 22, 2003 (on file with author) (noting that the state-
controlled Chinese media was not forthright about the SARS epidemic and was unresponsive to
the demands of ordinary Chinese for more information and action).
" Keith Bradsher, Security Laws Target of Huge Hong Kong Protest, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2003, at Al, 2003 WLNR 5170510.
'8 See Suffrage on Sufferance, supra note 31.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
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government to carry out further democratic reforms by granting the citizens of
Hong Kong a larger role in determining the actions of their government. A
Hong Kong government more responsive to its citizens would stand in stark
contrast to the undemocratic government which existed under colonial rule.
Under British colonial rule, Hong Kong had no democratic institutions.6"
Prior to the 1997 handover to China, "the Governor of Hong Kong was
appointed by the government of the United Kingdom and was" generally a
British citizen, not a citizen of Hong Kong.6 Also during colonial rule, the
Privy Council in London, not the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, was the
ultimate court for appeals.62 Finally, prior to 1991, the Legislative Council of
Hong Kong (LegCo) was also an undemocratic institution, as none of its
members were elected by the people.63 Instead, all sixty members of the
LegCo were appointed by the Royal Governor.' In 1991, however, the British
colonial government, with the consent of China, made several reforms in the
selection of LegCo members.65 Of the sixty members of the LegCo, twenty
were elected from geographical districts, ten were chosen by a Selection
Committee, and thirty were elected by various constituencies.66 The constitu-
encies are groups of people of similar backgrounds, generally from the
professional and commercial classes, who were appointed by the government
and were largely viewed as a pro-government group.67 Thus, while there was
a semblance of democracy in Hong Kong prior to the 1997 handover to China,
60 Costa, supra note 14, at 846.
61 Carole J. Petersen, The Right to Equality in the Public Sector: An Assessment of Post-
Colonial Hong Kong, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 103, 106 (2002).
61 See Lilly W.Y. Heong, Note, One Country, Two Ideologies: The Rule ofLaw in the Hong
Kong SpecialAdministrative Region, 16 TEMP. INT'L& CoMP. L.J. 447,466 (2002) (noting that
all appeals involving novel issues were heard by the Privy Council).
63 Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's "One Country, Two
Systems " Modelfor Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 497, 512 (1997). The
consent of both the Governor and LegCo was required before a bill could become law, thus the
LegCo could do little by itself besides block executive action. Id. at 511-12. This process has
remained intact since the handover, as the Chief Executive must still sign bills passed by the
LegCo. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, art. 76 (1990) (P.R.C.), 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1533 [hereinafter Basic Law],
available at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/-pchksar/BasicLaw/bas-lawO.htm.
6 Cooney, supra note 63, at 512.
65 H.L. Fu & Richard Cullen, National Security Law in Hong Kong: Quo Vadis a Study of
Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, 19 UCLA PAC. BAStN L.J. 185, 201.
66 Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism Under Chinese Rule: Hong Kong After the
Handover, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 279 (1999).
67 Id. at 279 & n.21, 284, 298.
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the Hong Kong government still remained largely unaccountable to its
constituents, the people of Hong Kong.
Since the handover, Hong Kong's government has undergone further
reforms in order to make it more politically accountable to its citizens. For
example, Hong Kong's judiciary is no longer subordinate to the Privy Council
in London. Instead, the Hong Kong-based Court of Final Appeal is now the
court of last resort for Hong Kong litigants.6" Additionally, the judges of the
Court of Final Appeal are now subject to confirmation and removal by the
LegCo,69 which had no control over the Privy Council in colonial days.
The LegCo has also gained additional powers since the 1997 handover.
While the LegCo had no power to remove the Royal Governor when Hong
Kong was a British colony, the LegCo now has the power to impeach the Chief
Executive for "serious breach of the law or dereliction of duty."7 The LegCo
can also force the Chief Executive to resign if he and the LegCo cannot
agree.7 If the Chief Executive submits a bill to the LegCo and the bill is
rejected, the Chief Executive may dissolve the LegCo.72 However, if the
newly elected LegCo also rejects the Chief Executive's bill, the Chief
Executive must resign.73 Additionally, if the Chief Executive vetoes a bill
passed by the LegCo and the LegCo passes the bill by a two-thirds majority,
the Chief Executive must sign the bill or dissolve the LegCo.74 If the newly
elected LegCo again passes the bill by a two-thirds majority and the Chief
Executive still refuses to sign it, the Chief Executive must resign." Thus, the
LegCo has much more power over the executive than it did during colonial
days.
While there has been movement towards allowing more democracy in Hong
Kong since the handover, several problems still remain. For example, laws
passed by the LegCo and signed by the Chief Executive must be reported to the
6 Basic Law, supra note 63, art. 82, 29 I.L.M. at 1534.
69 Id. art. 73(7), 29 I.L.M. at 1532.
70 Id. art. 73(9), 29 I.L.M. at 1532. Once fifteen members of the LegCo have charged the
Chief Executive with such an act, an independent investigation committee is formed by the Chief
Justice of the Court of Final Appeal. Id. The committee then gives the LegCo its findings, and
a two-thirds vote by the LegCo at this stage will result in the impeachment of the Chief
Executive. Id.
71 Id. arts. 50 & 52, 29 I.L.M. at 1529.
72 Id. art. 50,29 I.L.M. at 1529.
71 Id. art. 52(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1529.
74 Id. arts. 49 & 50, 29 I.L.M. at 1529.
71 Id. art. 52(2), 29 I.L.M. at 1529.
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National People's Congress in Beijing for approval.76 Thus the Chinese
government has veto power over all Hong Kong legislation. Additionally, half
of the sixty members of the LegCo are still elected by the various constituen-
cies.77 Although this appears to grant the citizens more power, the increased
power of the directly elected members of the LegCo is diluted by a provision
allowing all laws introduced by the government to be passed by a simple
majority of the LegCo, while bills introduced by an individual member of the
LegCo must be passed by a super-majority vote: a majority of the members
elected by the constituencies and a majority of the directly elected members
must approve the bill.7" Even if a bill introduced by an individual member is
passed by a super-majority, it still must be approved by the Chief Executive79
and the National People's Congress in Beijing before becoming law. 0 Thus,
while the government of Hong Kong is more responsive to the wishes of its
citizens than it was in colonial days, the government is only as responsive to
its citizens as it chooses to be.
Shortly after the protests, it seemed that the mechanism for choosing the
Chief Executive and members of the LegCo could be altered in 2007. l
Although there were no firm plans for allowing the direct, popular election of
the Chief Executive, many of the protesters demanded this right, and some felt
it could become a reality sooner rather than later.8 2 Feeling the pressure, the
Hong Kong Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, initially indicated that he would
be open to electoral reforms in 2007 or even earlier.8 3 If electoral reforms
were to occur, it would be a welcome and promising sign that the Hong Kong
government is committed to democracy and the rule of law.
Thus, while the government of Hong Kong has become much more
accountable to its citizens over the past twenty years, further reforms are
necessary. For example, doing away with constituencies and allowing all
members of the LegCo to be elected from geographic districts would make the
76 Id. art. 17, 29 I.L.M. at 1523.
77 Suffrage on Sufferance, supra note 31.
78 See Basic Law, supra note 63, at Annex 11 (11), 29 I.L.M. at 1548.
79 Id. art. 48(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1528.
80 Id. art. 17, 29 I.L.M. at 1523.
" Id. Annex 11 (111), 29 I.L.M. at 1548.
82 Julie Chao, Hong Kong Upset over Subversion Bill, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 2, 2003, at
Al, 2003 WLNR 6214977.
83 See HK's Tung Says Public Constitutions on Electoral Reform to Begin 2004, AFX ASIA,
Aug. 3, 2003 (relating Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's response to Democratic
Party councillor Lai Chi-keong's query concerning a public consultation on electoral reforms,
with Chee-hwa assuring their launch in 2004).
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LegCo much more representative. Additionally, directly electing the Chief
Executive would create more accountability. If these changes were made,
many of the protesters' demands would be satisfied. Additionally, such
reforms could signal to Taiwan that China is serious about democratic reforms
and being more responsive to its citizens.
V. AN OPPORTUNITY SQUANDERED
The decision by Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa to withdraw
the proposal to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law in Hong Kong
presented a maj or opportunity for China and Taiwan to come closer together.
The proposal emboldened activists from many diverse backgrounds and from
across the globe. In flexing their muscle, these groups showed the Hong Kong
government that they treasure their freedoms and will go to great lengths to
keep them. Additionally, the proposal also emboldened protesters to demand
more accountability from their government and more democratic reforms.
Both goals of the protesters were satisfied, as the proposal was withdrawn and
the government hinted that further democratic reforms might be undertaken in
the near future. 4
In addition to the direct positive effects on Hong Kong, the actions of the
Hong Kong and Beijing governments in withdrawing the proposal opened the
door to fulfilling Taiwan's initial requirements contained in the Guidelines for
National Unification. If the Chinese continue to embrace and uphold civil
liberties and democracy in Hong Kong, the attitudes of many Taiwanese about
reunification with China will likely change. If China can successfully
implement the "one nation, two systems" model in Hong Kong by upholding
freedom and democracy, Deng Xiapoing's vision of bringing the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China together peacefully could be
within the grasp of the two nations. This is an opportunity which should not
be squandered.
Within a very short time period, however, both the mainland Chinese and
the Taiwanese squandered this opportunity to move closer together as tensions
increased across the Strait of Taiwan. In late 2003, Taiwanese President Chen
Shui-bian became more belligerent towards the mainland and began to make
84 Further protests have since taken place, with the protesters demanding more political
accountability from their leaders and more democracy. See, e.g., Philip P. Pan, Hong Kong
Protesters March Again for Vote; Peaceful Gathering is Largest Since July Rally, WASH. POST,
Jan. 2, 2004, at A13.
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overt threats of a formal declaration of independence."5 While some believed
this was mere political posturing by President Chen to aid in his spring re-
election campaign, 6 his comments greatly angered Beijing."7  Indeed,
President Chen' s comments also caused the United States, generally regarded
as Taiwan's closest friend on the international stage, to rebuke him for acting
in a unilateral manner to resolve Taiwan's future.8" At the same time,
however, President George W. Bush also told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
that the United States would get involved if China were to act unilaterally to
resolve the Taiwan question. 9 With President Chen's close and extremely
controversial reelection and continued belligerence towards the mainland,
tensions across the Strait are not expected to cool in time to take advantage of
this unique opportunity.9"
Meanwhile, in early 2004, Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa
indefinitely postponed the democratic reforms that would lead to direct
elections of all LegCo members and of his Chief Executive position.9" In
April, the reforms were indefinitely postponed by the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress in Beijing, the first time that body had
unilaterally interfered in Hong Kong's local affairs.9" More ominous for
relations between China and Taiwan, however, is the belief that China will
now begin to assert itself more fully in Hong Kong's affairs, despite its
promise to give Hong Kong "a high degree of autonomy."93 While these
85 See Joseph Kahn, Chinese Officers Say Taiwan 's Leaders Are Near 'Abyss of War, 'N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A7, 2003 WLNR 5651060.
86 See Editorial, Chinese Straits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16.
" Kahn, supra note 85 (quoting Chinese military officers who stated that "Taiwan's
leadership had pushed the island toward an 'abyss of war,' " and also noting that "Chinese
military officers do not write articles or speak out in official interviews without clearance from
the highest levels").
88 See Bush Raps Taiwan over Referendum, as He Meets China's Premier, CHANNELNEWS
ASIA, Dec. 10, 2003.
89 Id.
90 In fact, Taiwan's President Chen gave a speech on October 10, 2004, which he described
as an overture to the mainland, but which was widely viewed as inflammatory. See Speaking
Across the Strait-Taiwan and China, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2004, at 38-39, available at 2004
WLNR 10890846.
9' Philip P. Pan, Hong Kong Postpones Timetablefor Reforms; Beijing's Request for Talks
Forced Delay, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2004, at A15.
92 See US., UK. Blast China Over Hong Kong Decree, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,118300,00.html.
93 Pan, supra note 91.
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decisions obviously angered many citizens of Hong Kong,94 they are equally
likely to anger those in Taiwan who had hoped that China might be serious
about introducing democracy in Hong Kong.
Considering these recent developments, it appears that the opportunity for
China and Taiwan to move closer together in the wake of the withdrawal of the
proposal to implement Article 23 has passed. While both China and Taiwan
publicly claim to desire reunification, the two countries appear more eager to
squabble than to take advantage of opportunities presented to them to reunify.
Instead of applauding Hong Kong's and China's decisions to withdraw the
Article 23 proposal, and acknowledging the newfound respect for democracy
and freedom of expression in Hong Kong, Taiwan's President Chen chose to
become more critical of, and more belligerent towards, the mainland. Thus,
instead of taking advantage of the opportunity for a peaceful reconciliation and
reunification, both Chinese and Taiwanese, as well as the rest of the world,
now fear an armed conflict in the Strait of Taiwan between the two countries.
As tensions across the Strait of Taiwan continue to increase and both sides
become more bellicose, the world may one day regret allowing this opportunity
for a peaceful solution to the "two Chinas problem" to pass by these nations.
9' See id. (comments of Protest Organizer Richard Tsoi).
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